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C o r n e l 1 U n i v e r s i t y
1890.
Prominent a(,ong the varied fields of juridical sci-
enco, in all systems of jurisp.,.dence, stands the law re-
lating to Wills ana testamentary disposition. if com-
parisons were apt, i -F the lines of dei.arkation between
the nmnberless branches of the law were easily trace-
able, the critical scrutineer would hardly experience
surpi'ise on learning that the law of VWills has extended
its sphere beyond the scope of any other branch of le-
r'al science.
Unlike much of the comon law, it grew up from the
civil state and does not owe its inception to positive
law. its precise ori£'in is lost in the mazes of antiq-
uity. Tradition, however, reveals,/to us as the out-
growth of advancing civilization and municipal upris-
in :. The g rowth of wisdom, the developm--ent of science
and the gradual recognition of t: ose principles which se-
cure to men their inherent rights, had to do with the or-
igin and groowth of this division of the law. Thus from
the hidden mysteries of aistant ages evolved, like many
philosophic innovations,this important factor in the
gP.eat mass of the law.
Law in its incipiency was an abstruse science.
From the tiny germ grew the sturdy trunk, spiread its
branches over ne'i ter'itory and dropping there it- see.s
of progress to perm again and overlap new doinions.
Guiaed by the light of modern reason, and feirtilized
by the metaphysical ingenuity of lawyer and judge, it
has attained that deFree of perfection which the state
of human society demands.
A Will has been defined to be the legal ceclara-
tion of a man's intentions of what he wills to be per-
formed after his death. But a will, in its legal sig-
nification, usually has refei-ence to a disposition of
property to tale effect after death.
Whence does a man acquire this right of empire,
reaching!: beyond his mortal life, and over property ahich
is no longer his 2 Again we are referred. to the faded
lines of tradition. Its pages tell us that Wills in the
days of the patriarchs, were known among the Hebrews and
are evidenced by the '.ritings f sacred Scripture.
Solon first introduced them them into Athens; Sir VL.
Blackstone has written tat the, we'e unknown in Rome
before the laws of the 1:'. tables, ,ut e inent author-
itic, question the correctness of this statement, and
it is believed to be erroneous. in L n'land Wills were
coeval with the first rudiments of law.
Wills, then, concern the uisposition of property
after the death of the testator. While, as shown, the
laws governing them are ti.e product of the civil state,
they have a remote origin in that human instinct which
loves the acquisition and control of property; a senti-
ieont which, "when kept within the sphere of moderation,
is the basis of social progress, but in morbid excesses,
i.arks tie prop;ress of declension ancL the inci'ease of
crime. "
Property and possession, in the primitive state,
were confounded in one. Possess sion was inseparable
fro property and was the true test of ownership. qo
one could assert a better title than the one in possession.
Possession was t hercore equivalent to absolute owner-
ship. The first to occupy becarme tha rirIhtful owner un-
til he abandoned his possession, when in turn the next
to occupy succeeded. him as ownei'. Lut slo-'zly this right
ojpossession grew to be a substantive ripht-a- property
4iv: the thin,--- which could be t, ansferr,,d by the will of
the owner. Lord Chief Lawn Eilbert says the change
:as produced by the necessity of the time; that the pro-
ducts of one climate became necessary in others w'iich
were non-productive thereof and from the custom thus Ds-
tablished of exchanging, t1he rir'ht to dispose of prop-
eriy gained recognition. But before the possession and
p ropei-t, became distinct, it will be seen that transfer
could obtain only before death; and the only analogy
to the present disposition by will -:ias the gift causa
mortis. But then as now, men were hela together by, a,
supernatural power. Those unseverable ties of hum
afIection which bind all men drew to the death bed of
the Lying man his kincared, aria naturally to them fell
his property, until in time this custom grew to be a
fi1,ed and re-cognized rule. Lastly then in order came
the recofnized right in the individual to name the object
of his bounty after his decease.
Among the pr'imitive Romans, the f11nilia was a spe-
cies of modern corporation, with the father as the great
head. The notable feature was th-e preservation of the
family compact, and in case of the approaching7 death of
5the father without la ,iful heirs, he was allowed to choose,
under certain conditions, a per-son who should succeed
hit:i as heir. in this we see the modern Will in a crude
state. Devises were comon amonf- the Saxons as ear-ly
as 1000 A. L. and probably rere practiced by thegn
long before. The ri!iit to itake wills was established
at a very early '_ay in England,, both as to realty and
personalty, but vanished, especially as to the forner
on the incoming; of the feudal system. But it was au'ain
fully established by the statutes of 32 Henry VIII and
Charles Ii. The precedents thus gradually developed
among thie great nations of the orient were transplanted
to America by the earliest colonial adverturers and in-
corporated into our national jurisprudence.
Leaving, after this superficial examination, the
subject of Wills in general, we come to treat of that
narrower division of the subject ahich concerns trusts
created by the use of precatory words. it is an intri-
cate and subtle branch of the law of wills.
The rules of law generally applicable to trusts
cr ated by deed are inapplicable here, because arbitrary
i ales of construction and interpretation are disrerarded
Cin the attempt to ar'ive at the intention of the test .±tor
A t,:. stator is presu ed to use words accoi' infr to
their ordinary meaning; technical rules s-ay, and in some
cases are, applied, in constructinF the instrarent.
This is done oiily when the intention cannot be rathered
from the general purport of the instrument. Liberality
of meaning is always periAssible, and if the object which
the testator had in mind plainly appears, technical rules
must yield to the intention, if the design of the tes-
tator would be defeated by the application of arbitrary
rules of construction.
•lt is by the viEorous application of this cardinal
rule of construction that the doctrine of precatory trusts
.,i:ich we are to consider, has found its way into legal
treatises, and beco-ie , we contend, essentially an es-
tablised part of the jurispruaence of England and Amer-
A
ica.
The worc! 'Irrecatoryu comes froi the Latin "precoy)',
meaning to supplicate, or besoech. Precatory words
are those expressive of desire, wish, cota.and or en-
treaty. The doctrine had its origin w!ith t!±oe first ap-
plication of the rule of interpretation above stated.
It may be said to have Litd a ra,-ote oritgin in the sanc-
tity w.hich is attached to wills by t!,e Courts. The
-"esi'e of the judiciary to effectuate the intentions
of tie testatvr' led to the establishment of the rule
(Hill on Trustees, 73). The right to ri'ake disposition
of property, once doubted, had bi, cctne a fixed rule of
lw, and of a sacred character. It often happens that
a husband and father cheishs unbounded confidence in
the devoted wife who for years has been his c6ipanion
in life. On her, first of all, he wishes to bestow
his accutw.,ulated property in i.ts fullest enjoymient.
Lut he has children equally dear to him, and toward whom,
by natural impulses, his generosity is directed. How
can his -,-.sires b,, effected, doing equal justice to both
classes? A limited estate to the wife, with the pos-
itive direction t~lvt upon her deatii the est te -o to
the children, would be contradictory to that true spirit
o0f confidence which should exist between husband and wife.
It would wound the sensitive feelings of the true wife
on discovering that her years of faithful services had
failed to win for her the confidence of her husband.
3Her fidelity would be 'ewvrded only by an unjust rebuke.
It is this line of cases in '.hich precatory words are
held to create a trust, the words being only expressive
of a wish, and construed to be imperative, the mode of
expression beinp held to be only expressive of civility.
Again it v-ay happen that children of tender age
survive the parent--incompetent to manage their own af-
fairs. It is meet and proper that the husband should
pass his property to his wife, with the same civil re-
quest that she, upon her death, devise it to her chil-
dren in obedience to the behest of her deceased husbahd.
Suppose no trust were held to be created in the case
just supposed; the i-.isplaced confidence of the unsus-
pecting' husband >ight be ignored by the ungrateful wife,
to the detrit.-ent o- those upon w"-o!: the testator had
iitended to bestow his property. To repudiate the doc-
trine under consideration would be to ignore the will of
the testator and while his lips are sealed in death,
his wishes are being grossly violated, because of his
isplaced confidence. To form an intellig:ent estii1iate
of how often his confidence is abused, Vie need only re-
fer to the numberless cases in which the doctrine of -
9precatory trusts has been invoked, in nearly every case
it will be found that thie express desires of the de-
ceaseu are being impugned, and an observation oi them
soughJt to be enforced.
What is believed to have b>;eu t'e origin of the doc-
trine of nrecatory trusts has been circumscribed.
The theory seems to be founded on reason, and supported
by vague yet apparent allusions of many text writers and
jurists. Nevertheless it may be said to depend for
support upon sentimentality, rather than logical neces-
sity. Eut the rule has been ascribed to a different, and
what may seem to some, more plausible, source, than the
one mentioned, 'hich merits at least a superficial scru-
tiny in connection with our subject.
In the !'atter of Pennocks estate, (20 Pa. State,
268), the doctrine was for the first time sought to be
enforced in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The
origin, history and application of the doctrine have
received a lengthy consideration at the hands of Mr.
justice Lowrie, in which he referring to the use of prec-
atory words in wills, said: "It is unquestionable that
such ,,oides of expression -Cefe fonnerly used in the Romran
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and English law, in order to create a trust, and it .as
founded on good reason; but if that reason had passed
away before the settlement of this country, then the rule
which depended upon it was not imported as a part of the
law which we brought from, the mother country. That it
remains cf any force in England after the -'eason of it
has ceased is not surprising, for it a corm,,on fate of
institutions to outlive .the causes *jhich gave rise to
them, and thus vea:,.r often the form survives the prin-
ciple which it was thus a signed to express." Con-
tinuing, he ac,.its the itaportation of the rule from the
Roman to the D-,rlish law, but says it had its origin
in the constraint of circumstances. hie shrews a *nU.-
mentatively that the "instituted" Roman heir was com-
pelled by accepting the estate of his ancestor to pay all
his debts, and, as a compensation he could disregard the
provisions of the will which r:ave to others; and that
unc er such a state of th-infs, the execution of t..e tes-
tator's wishes being ,'ntil-ely dependent on the will of
his heir, words of entrea.ty were mo.ve efficacious and
appropriate than words of cormn and. Secondly he reasons
that owing to the o:reat covn:lexity of the Toman Will and
thie strict observance ol' the complex fonmi and conse-
unent probability of the will being: defeated, a custom
arose of 'entreating' the heir, by means of a codicil,
to,cuispose of hi property accordinr' to his exPl'ossed
intentions in t!ie will, if t e instr,..t its-lf failed
to operate as such in the hands of the law.
This learned writer alludes to no authority in sup-
port of his assertions. We su.t,-it that they are un-
substantiatec by. tradition or the writinrs of authorita-
tive juriaical commentators or historians.
It is tra* that the Roman heir" succeeded to the en-
tire legal position of the intestate or testator, but,
says iMr. 1lorey, "The heir is bound to distribute the
property of vrhich he coves into possession acco 'ding to
the le _'ally exprossed will of the decedent. In early
times this duty was absolute, so that after, debts were
paid., the -.eai ining property of the estate might be en-
tirely exhausted in legacies, leaving nothing in the
hands of the heir to compensate him for assuming and
administer-ing the estate."
If the debts exceeded the value of the estate, the
heir was nevertheless bound to entingusih them. As
early as the Republic laws we-'e passed to correct this
injustice.. But prior to this legislation, it ;Tas com-
mon foi heirs to reflse to succred to the estate of the
acceased, because the \hole mi 'ht be e,,rausted in lega-
cies. To induce heirs to accept, the lex fa;'ia and
lox voconia 'rere enacteu to limit the right of the tes-
tator tc uevise, but oxin', t 1,_, oCnes of c(.nstrliction,
the, fileu in their pu_,pose, ad finallrhe I.c: fal-
cidia law was passeca, about 40 B. C., i,.ich prohibited
a testator fr'ov. devising more than tire....ur.... of hiS
enti.-e estate after his debts weie paid. The retain-
in" one-fourth enurou to the heir, called the 1'alcidian
portion.
This p obably served as a remuneration for the li-
ability which the heir as u .ed till the time of Justin-
ian, ;hen he grantea the inventory, (beneficid inventari)
by means of which the liability (f tc.~ heir was measured
b,; the value of thie est-c te to which he succeeded. Gaius
(section 24), says: in the olo times a man might law-
fully spend his whole patrimony and gifts of freedom,
anc! leave nothing to the heir except an empty name. "
The XII Tables provided: "As the legacies of what is
his are, so let the law be." it thus a1ppears that the
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requirement that legacies be uisposed of according to
the terms ;vere not only enforceable, but was expressly
req-ircu by the '11 Tables. "The :'osult of this lep-
isla'.ion", says iihnter, ".jas that hei's held bac. f om
the inheriance ana so many men die intestate."
Aft,;er admitting the imporatiun of the doctrine of
p-'ecatory trusts from the Romean to the English law, IJ .
Justice Lowrie further incoheren1j attempts another,
reason foe, its recognition there. He says that devises
were priohibite durin- the feudal per-iod, that trusts
;ie1 'e resortec, to instead, and -hese nut being enforce-i
able, worcis of entieaty 4ere .-xsorted to. Without
attempting to eluciuate the histurical inacUaacy uf this
statement, v-e will unl aud that the fabic of civil-
ized la'a in Enplanc. ,-as woven from shl-eds left by the
Romar occupation. it paved the .Va; for the Saxon
invasion, anu V(iarn lawis, bleneu with the rude barbar-
ian-,saes, c .iprised the Saxon and ea'-ly English sys-
terls. To IJote fr'oi.- a le-. neu .'rizer, "The inheritance
of Roman wisdom was ; ansitlea to the fierce barbar-
ians of the aest, arlia as they wr-ought the ma, -i'ials of
the temple and amphitheatre into theirL o-,in time f-cit-
res,:es anci u,'ellings, so oiu they occasionally inco'-
purate fr.-agments of uman laws intu ,icii- .,v n unformIu
i-;Irnnnce. T:ii' ho,/ev '', the!/ sometimes
uic, unconsciously, at. -'.nr, at i!,ost a ,ainst thai will,
b'at ,jhen societ; improvou, ,.n iok. on tho i'urian law
1 i~si inc ea~'oai veneration, :ts the su' est basis of ci-
vil ouer. (Phil~iure' s Int. to Rorn. Law;,, p. ll.1)
Justly acc Jauiting th. ..'L'itings o& these le fled
aathors, we contend that rh easons asc,-ibed fur the
insti-.ution of this aoci'ine by the Romans never ex-
istea aaionp them; that at no timo had t-e heil the iright
to disi'-erara the t :,'ms of a *ill and take his ances-
tor's p-o7-erty as a cotipensation -for 1c liabiliTr
whlich he assumea -fo the payment of .ebts; but that, on
the cont;,a'y, he ias bound to observe the directions of
the uill in cisposinp: of the property after uebts .'ere
paid, even in cases wihore he , s th'b; entirely ct
off f:'o~1 his riht of in-iei'itance.
Lat whateve,' r;. have bcon tile oiigin of the ucc-
trin ,, ,hete t, .aceble tu the 1 nius of the stoic
rilosohe , oe oie lu'aa o ina o b- 'ian Saon, Evi 'on
or the homoroneous law of the barbar-ian Saxon, conce'ns
us but little now. If reasons for sustaining it now ex-
ist, it should be retained as a part of our jurispru-
dence whether they be identical with the original or not,
Perhaps on no doctrine of the English and American
law have more widely different views prevailed as to its
salutary effects. By some courts and writers fiercely
condemned and utterly repudiated or evaded as a 7art of
the law, while by others of equal eminence, it has re-
ccived laudable commendation.
In discussing this doctrine, Mr. Justice Storey
says "-
The doctrine of construing expressions of recommend
ation, confidence, hc e, wish, and desire into positive
and peremptory commands is difficult to be maintained
upon a soLund princinle of interpretation of the actual
intentions of the testator. It can scarcely be presumed
that every testator should not clearly understand the
difference between such expressions and words of positiv e
direction and command, and that in using the one and
omitting the other, he should have a determined end in
view. It will be a ,reed on all hands that when the in-
tention of the testator is to leave the whole object as
16
a pure matter of discretion, to the free will and pleas-
ure of the narty enjoying his confidence and favor, and
when his expressions of desire are entrusted as mere
moral suggestions to excite and aid that discretion, b-t
not absolutely to govern and control it, then the lan-
guage cannot and ought not to create a trust".
In Cotton vs same, in the United States TDistrict of
California, 1884, the doctrine received a harsh rebuke
at the hands of the Court ; a testatnr gave all his
prGperty to his wife, and added : "I recommend to her
the care and protection of my mother". The Court in its
oninion said : "It is urged on the part of the claimant
that in this class of cases, a wish expressed or a simple
request, to the devoted and obedient wife, is equivalent
to a conmand. This when voluntarily recognized as an
obligation by the wife, in the affairs of married life,
may be a very rroper and s'lutary principle and practice
in marital rolity and domestic etiquette, but it is too
romantic, to largely deficient in the sanctions of the
oblivations of r ositive law, too loose and uncertain to
be ado-ted by the Courts as a rule of law, by which
large estates are to be distributed in oprosition to the
17
plain, ordinary, actual matter of fact words of a will."
It is obvious that these criticisms proceed upon an
eroneois view of the reason for the establishment of the
rule, to wit to effectuate the intentions of the t2s-
tator. "Intention is the nolar star to guide .s in the
construction of wills", said Marshal Chief Justice, in
Smith vs Bell, 6 Pet. 75 ) and as we have previously
shown this is the purnorted universal doctrine. But we
submit that it is not observed in many cases where pre-
catory words have been held not to create a trust.
Intention cannot be distinguished from desire, with-
in the meaning of this rule. "Intention is when the
mind, with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its
view on any idea" (Locke). What can be the design of the
testator in u1sing these recommendatory words ?
Is it not a bending of the mind toward an idea, with a
hope that it will become a realization ? HTe may not ex-
press his intenticns in rositive terms, yet they are just
as apparent and capable of being interpreted, as if he
do. He fithholds a bold command with a hu.mane regard for
the sensitiveness of those to whom he is dearly attached.
Says L. d Loughborough :- "When a person recommends to
18
another who is independent of him, there is nothing in-
per' tive ; but if he recommends that to be done by a per-
son whom he has a right to order it to be done, the mode
is only civility".
If there is any virtue in the rule of construction
under consideration it should be applied where only the
desire is expressed, as well as the settled intention,
admitting that there is a refined distinction, which we
doubt. A desire is but an immature intention. The one
leads to the other. A desire rirens into an intention.
If the intention is sacred, a thing to be respected, then
the same in an embryo state should be held equally sa-
cred as long as n more fixed or definite purpose appears
As was said by Lore, Resedale, (quoted in Shav vs
Lawless, 5 Clark -nd 7in. 12C-54 ) :- "Where a testator
having it in his rower to dispose of his property, ex-
presses a desire as to the disposition thereof, and the
objects to which he refers are certain, the desire so ex-
pressed amounts to a command, and if he shows his desire,
FE P! FACT EXPRESSFS HIS INTENTICN, provided the objects
to which he refers are so defined that a court can act
upon the desire so ex-ressed."
This language portrays our meaning. Starting with
, 19
the hypothesis that the doctrine of construing a will
in accordance with the inLent ion of the testator, is o
sound, we contend that, although Lhe words desire and in-
tention may h'ave a different literal :eaning, yet apply-
ing the spirit of the above rule, they should be constried
as synonomous terms. A (esii'e of the mind is in fact
the intentio.n ,f the mind, if no stronger desire, or more
settled conviction, be expressed.
it is coirmon for judges of the modern dayito criticize
the doctrine of precatory trusts and comments to the ef-
fect that the doctrine should not be extended are fre-
quent. A careful examination of these cases will show
that the doctrine is as broadly recognized to-day as it
was nearly two centuries ago, and that the discrepanay be
tween the early and modern cases arises not in a repudia-
tion of the doctrine, rct in a narrower recognition of i4
but in the narrowness of the application of the rule giv-
ing effect to the intention of the testator.
A comparison of a few of the early with the later
cases, keeping sharply in mind the distinction which we
have pointed out, will, we think, support our conclu-
sions. In the case of Warding vs. Glyn, 468, decided in
1739, the testator r-ave to his wife certain property,
20
but' "desired" her to give it to such of his relations as
she should think most deserving and approve of." Lord
Iardwike, in considering the case s-id :- "Wphe'"e the
uncertainty is such that it is im-ossible for the Court
to determine what rersons are meant, it is very strong
for the Court to construe it as a recommnendation to the
first devisee and make it absolute to him. But here the
word relations is a legal description, and this is a de-
vise to such relations and omerates as a trust in the
wife. "The ,ife having failed to execute the will ac-
cording to the trust, the Court distributed it under the
Statute of distributions, remarking that it was not "b,7
virtue of the statute" bit that it was a"good rule to f o
by" in executiiig the discretioary rower vested in the
wife, she having inored the confidence reposed in her.
and failed to execute the trust.
The modern cases, especially the Tew York Courts,
would treat this devise as an absolute gift to the wife;
can it be doubted that the disposition of the case by
Lord Hardwicke -ras more strictly in accordance with the
intention of the testator ?
Again in 1782, Lord Chancellor Thurlow, in consid-
21
ering the case of I-Iarlan vs. Trigrc, (I Brolwn, 112) said
"But whenever there are annexed to such words precise
and direct objects, the law has connected the whole to-
gether and held the words sufficient to raise a trust--
but then the objects must be distinct". Here we have
the two testing elements which are universally applied
in the modern cases, to wit : a certain subject and a
certain object.
In all the modern English and American cases, the
doctrine 'as failed, not because of a repudiation of the
doctrine itself, but because of a failure of the cases
to bear the test of certainty of subject and object,
applying the same rule as in Harlan v. Trigg, (supra)--
Spooner vs.Lovejoy, 108 1ass. 572. L Metcalf, "rhipple v.
Arnold, ib. - In Re Adams, etc., 27 Chan. Div., 322.
7Aissouri Bank v. Raynor, 7 App. cases, 3?1, Gilbert v.
Chapin, 19 Conn. 346. Matter of Pennock's estate, 20
Pa. state, 203. Foose v. Whitmore, N. Y., 'r1ilde v.
Smith, 3 Braf. Surr. 95. Campbell v. Beaumont, 91 N.Y. !
z64. P'es. Ch v. Pisbrow, 52 Pa. state, 49. Lawrence
v. Cook, 104 N. Y., 632.
The case of Gilbert v. Chapin, (supra) is frequent-
ly ci ed asoverrulit the doctrine of nrecatory trusts
?2
but it does not. In the o inion the Court said "The
case which we are not considering does not require r(f is
a repudiation of the doctrine of recommendatory tr~ists
nor do we say that we would not sup-ort them in cases
wherein the language of recormnendation or desire very
clearly imnorts a fixed and im-Perati -e rur--ose", and
two of the judges dissented from this oninion. Judge
Waite in his dissentins, orinion said : "Whatever dis-
position some judges have manifested to limit the oper-
ation of the rule, no one could be found who at the pre-
sent day, would -resume to set it aside or refuse to ap-
ply it In a case falling clearly within the rule."
Again he says : "It is better, far better, that a rule
long est iblished and often recognized, should stand an-
til abrogated by the legislature than that it should be
made to change with the ch'anging orinions of judges,
,,hose business it is to apply the law as they find it,
and not as they wo1ld make it were they clothed with the
requisite power. "
In the case of Lawrence v. Cook, the testator by
one clause of his will gave all his pronerty absolutely
to his daughter. H- a subsequent clause he rrovided : "I
23
cornxit v grand-daughter to the charge and guardiansli'i
of my daug1iter, in whose honesty, good will and integritv
I repose the utmost confidence. I enjoin u-on her to
make such provision for my s-id -,rand-daughter out of ,,iy
estate, in sach manner, at such times and in such amounts
as she may judge to be expedient and conducive to the
welfare of said rand-child and her own se se of justice
and christian duty shall dictate." Lawrence J., at
Special Term, held there was no trust ; the General Term
reversed this de-ision, but the Court of A peals revers-
ed the order at General Term and affirmed the S'p'l teri-
decision, holding that the provision giving the daugh'ter
the right to provide "in such Pmounts nd :t such times
as she might deem expedient" .ras too indefinite, and
vested a discretionary nower in the devisee which the
Court refused to perform. It is submitted that upon
principles of equity and sound legal policy, the opinion
of the General Term in this case is the better. It held
the wor "enjoin" so imperious as to distinguish the
case from all reported cases, and sufficient to take it
out of the -eneral rule that an absolute disposition of
property cannot be affected byi Th:bsequent words of less
24
imperative meaning. Can it be doubted that this testa-
tor's wishes were violated by the unscruulousness of
the daughter aided by the arbitrary will of the Court ?
Can a nerson with ordinary corfrion sense read the words of
the testator, and then say it was his intention that the
grand-daughter should derive no benefits from his will ?
Had the Court held a trust created; made such provision
for the child as would be "conducive to the welfare of
said grand-daughter" and such as " a sense of justice an-
and christian duty shall dictate", as in Harding vs. Glyn;
would not this have been more in accordance with the
manifest intention of the testator ?
In Paul v. Compton, 8 Vesey, 375, Lord Eldon laid
down the rule thus :- "The cases upon words of recom-
mendation have, I take it, now settled upon this rule :
whether the terms aie those of recorrmendation, or preca-
tory, or expressing horg, or that the testator has no
doubt, if the objects with regard to whom such terms are
used are certain, and the subjects of rroperty to be
given are also certain, the words are considered impera-
tive; and create a trust. But the questions are very
different whether the words of a will create a trust or
a rower. If the words are ipmerative, they do not ore-
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ate a power; but they execute themselves by force of the
t erms .
To analyze this statement, it will be seen that
thequestion is, not what words in themselves are impera-
tive, but what words, certain conditions existing, will
be held to be imperative, by rresumption. 7rom this
position the New York and other courts seem to have
drifted toward holding that the words must be in their
primary signification, be imrerative instead of pre-
s-umino them imperative. The rule is thus stated in
Foose v. Whitmore, 8 a leading New York case ;-
"The real question is always, whether the wish or desire,
or reconmendation that is expressed by the testator
is meant to govern the conduct of tie party to whom it
is addressed, or whether it is merely an indication of
that which he thinks would be a reasonable exercise of
the discretion of the party, leavin7 it, however, to
the party to exercise his own discretion."
Notwithstanding the fierce condemnation of the
rule from many sources, it is given full recognition in
many states at the present day : Knox v. Knox 48 A.R.
487 (Wis.).Bispham on Equity, Sec. 72. and in England,
Le Merchant v. same. 18 L. R. Eq. cases, 414.
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In Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass., 276, the opinion of
the Court contained the followino,: "Te see no suffi-
cient ground for calling in question t-e w-isdom or poli-
cy of the rule of construction uniformly apnlied to
wills in Courts of England and most of the United States,
that words of entreaty, recommendation or Wish, ad-
dressed by a testator to a devisee or legatee, will
make him a trustee for the persons in whose favor such
expressions are used, proviled the testator has pointed
out with clearness and certainty the objects of the
trust and subject matter. Indeed, we cannot muderstand
the force or validity of the objections urp':ed against it
if care is taken to keep it in subordination to the -ri-
mary and cardinal rule that the intent of the testator
is to govern, and apply it only where the creation of
a trust will only subserve that intent." In that case
a widow gave her second husband certain property "In the
full confidence that he will, as he has heretofore done,
continue to give and afford such protection and support
to my children as they may stand in need of.' Held, a
trust for the children.
Mr. Bispham in his work on Equity Jurisprudence,
says the doctrine of recommnendatory trusts as laid down
in Warner v. Bates exists in all the United States
(Bispham, section 72).
Judge Lowrie, in the case discussed supra, says:
"We may now add that we know of no American case where
the antiquated Englis' rifle has been adopted." These
diametrically opposed opinions fairly demonstrate the
wide difference existin2 as to the present state of the
doctrine.
Our analysis of this subject was b-sed upon the
hypothesis that the doctrine of construing wills accord-
ing to the intention of the testator is a part of the
settled law of England and America. A defense of that
maxim is beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, if re-
peated judicial decisions of more than two centuries
are to be received as the best evidence of what the law
is, the question will not admit of argument.
From our review of this subject, we submit the
question whether the doctrine of precatory trusts does
not exist as fully to-day as a century ago; whether the
just, humane and sound legal principle on which it was
originally founded does not still remain to su-port it,
and whether the alleged tendency to drift away from it
is not really a drifting away from the doctrine that
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wills should be construed according to the intentions
of the testator ?
If a doctrine, nurtured and sanctioned by judicial
decisions in every part of the universe for upward of
two centuries, is to be repudiated and that, too,
without legislative sanction, we say let the Courts
frankly assume the responsibility, anrd not attempt to
shield their acts behind a more ropular but equally
effectual reason for its overthrow.

